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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Were there sufficient material facts at issue such that the 
trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The matter in controversy involves a real estate listing/blank 
form which was signed by a representative of defendants/appellants. It 
was, and is, the contention of appellants that, because material terms 
of the form were intentionally left blank, the intent of the parties in 
executing the agreement is a question of fact not properly resolved 
through summary judgment. 
Cross motions for summary judgment were filed by the parties and 
argued on August 30, 1985. On October 8, 1985, the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable 
David B. Dee, entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of 
plaintiffs/respondents. 
Because no findings of fact and conclusions of law were entered 
by the court, it is unclear upon what basis the court found there were 
no genuine issues of fact justifying summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The real property covered by the blank form which is the 
subject matter of the litigation was sold on December 31, 1984. 
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2. The purchaser of the property was not a purchaser generated 
as a result of any action on the part of respondents. See, Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3. 
3. The individual representatives of the parties involved 
were Ronald Christensen (hereinafter "Christensen") in behalf of res-
pondents and Michael R. McCoy (hereinafter "McCoy") in behalf of appel-
lants. See, Addendum I, attached hereto and incorporated herein by 
this reference. 
4. The document executed by Christensen and McCoy is a form 
agreement and certain material terms of the agreement were left blank; 
specifically, the date on which any agreement was to commence and a 
date upon which any agreement was to expire and be of no further force 
or effect. Further, the document fails to designate a listed price for 
the property. See, Addendum I. 
5. McCoy was not authorized to enter into an exclusive listing 
agreement by appellants and stated under oath that he executed the 
document only to permit respondents to place a sign on the building to 
advertise its availability and not as an exclusive listing agreement. 
See, McCoy Deposition, p. 38, lines 1-7; p. 43, lines 8-12. 
6. Christensen interpreted the listing to be a binding agree-
ment which gave plaintiffs/respondents an exclusive listing on the pro-
perty and was effective for an indefinite period of time. See, Chris-
tensen Deposition, p. 45, lines 18-20. 
7. This action was initiated by the respondents and a hearing 
was held on cross-motions for summary judgment on August 30, 1985. 
8. On October 8, 1985, the trial court entered its order deny-
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ing appellants motion for summary judgment and granting the motion of 
respondents. 
9. Appellants Notice of Appeal was timely filed on November 5, 
1985. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy which should be applied 
cautiously. The pleadings and documentary evidence before the court 
should be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment. 
The evidence before the trial court in this matter clearly 
indicated the presence of significant disputes as to facts which are 
material to resolution of this controversy; thus, the granting of 
summary judgment was inappropriate in this matter and the case should 
be remanded for further proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS/RESPONDENTS 
BECAUSE THE FACTUAL DISPUTES RAISED BY APPELLANTS 
ARE SUFFICIENT TO PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The matter before the court is a contract dispute. Respondents 
claim that the listing form (Addendum I) constitutes a binding, en-
forceable agreement between the parties, despite the absence of what 
appellants assert are material terms. 
In opposing respondents' motion for summary judgment, appellants 
raised the following issues: 
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1. Appellants argue that the form was signed merely as an 
accommodation to allow respondents to place a sign on the property; 
respondents argue that the listing form was intended to be a binding, 
exclusive agreement which would allow respondents to market the 
property and receive a commission. 
2. Appellants asset that no commission was discussed either 
prior to or at the time the form was signed, primarily because appel-
lants had not at that time determined whether the property was to be 
sold or leased or marketed in some other manner. 
3. Appellants noted that no listing price was included in the 
form because no marketing strategy had yet been determined and the 
document was signed merely to allow respondents to place their sign on 
the building in an effort to ascertain interest in the property. 
4. Appellants argue that, absent a definite term in and form 
there is no discernible way in which it can be determined that the 
property was sold during the time when the contract was in force. 
Because of the conflicting testimony and evidence concerning the 
intent of the parties in executing the form and in absence of such 
fundamental terms a? the listing price and the exact terms during 
which the listing would be enforceable, the effect of the summary 
judgment granted by the trial court was to "fill in the gaps" and 
create an enforceable contract where none existed. 
In determining whether to grant a motion for summary judgment, 
the task of the trial court is to examine the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, admissions and the affidavits on file and 
ascertain from the pleadings and exhibits whether a genuine issue of 
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material fact exists. If a dispute as to any material fact is evident, 
summary judgment may not be granted. 
This court has held that cross motions for summary judgment do 
not, in and of themselves, resolve factual issues. In Amjacs Inter-
west, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d 53 (Utah 1981), the court 
stated: 
"As an initial consideration, we note that the 
filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does 
not mean that this case may be finally disposed 
of as a matter of law. Cross-motions for summary 
judgment do not ipso facto dissipate factual 
issues, even though both parties contend for the 
purposes of their motions that they are entitled 
to prevail because there are no material issues 
of fact." 
635 P.2d at 55 
It is well established that summary judgment should only be in-
voked in cases where it clearly appears, from the record before the 
court that the moving party has established his right to judgment, be-
yond a doubt. See, Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, supra; 
Tangren v. Ingalls, 367 P.2d 179 (Utah 1961); Jensen v. Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980); Livingston Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 565 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1977). 
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must con-
sider factual inferences as tending to show triable issues of material 
fact in the light most favorable to the existence of such issues. See, 
Kidman v. White, 378 P.2d 898 (Utah 1963); Northern Contracting Co. v. 
Allis-Chalmers Corp., 573 P.2d 65 (Ariz. 1977). The district court 
failed to do so in this case. 
To successfully defeat a motion for summary judgment, the oppos-
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ing party must only bring to light specific facts which present a 
genuine issue for trial which, if resolved in favor of the nonmoving 
party, would entitle him to prevail. Indeed, summary judgment is only 
appropriate in those situations where there is no set of facts which, 
if proved, would allow the nonmoving party to succeed. See, Jackson 
v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982). Here appellants clearly demon-
strated 
that in order to prevail, the respondents must show the property was 
sold within the term of a listing; since no one knew the term, the 
court could see or should have been able to see that an issue of fact 
exists. 
In the case of Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1975), this court noted that: 
" . . . [I]t only takes one sworn statements under oath to 
dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy 
and create an issue of facts. This is analogous to the 
elemental rule that the fact trier may believe one witness 
as against many, or many against one." 
542 P.2d 191, 193 
The court went further in Holbrook, supra, holding that if there 
is any dispute as to an issue material to resolution of the contro-
versy, summary judgment should not be granted. 542 P.2d 191, 193. 
It is undisputed that the signed deposition of McCoy qualified as a 
sworn statement in dispute of the facts claimed by the plaintiffs. 
As more fully discussed below, defendants/appellants in this action 
raised sufficient disputes as to material facts to preclude the 
granting of summary judgment. 
As noted by the court in Northern Contracting Co. v. Allis-
Chalmers Corp., 573 P.2d 65 (Ariz. 1977), in considering a motion for 
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summary judgment, neither the trial court, nor the appellate court may 
weigh the evidence presented and if conflicting inferences can be drawn 
from the circumstances, summary disposition is unwarranted. Id. at 67. 
See, also, Tanqren v. Inqalls, 367 P.2d 179, 185 (Utah 1961); Holbrook 
Company v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193. 
Specifically dealing with cases in which the written contract 
was alleged to have been ambiguous, this court has consistently held 
that where the contract itself contained uncertain or missing terms, 
evidence on the intent of the parties was both permissible and appro-
priate in resolving the controversy. See, Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 
P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983); Hellstrom v. Osquthorpe, 455 P.2d 28, 29 
(Utah 1969); Kidman v. White, 378 P.2d 898, 899 (Utah 1963). 
The situation confronting the trial court in this case involved 
a written form in which certain materials terms, i.e. the listing price 
and the term of the agreement, were omitted. The averments of the par-
ties as to why those terms were omitted differs significantly. 
Of particular significance in the instant case is the omission 
of an effective term during which the purported agreement would be in 
force. Appellants urged in their opposition to respondents1 motion for 
summary judgment that without this material term, it is impossible to 
determine whether or not a commission is due in that it is impossible 
to determine whether the sale took place during a period of time when 
the agreement was in effect. If the effective term of the agreement 
had terminated prior to consummation of a sale, no commission would be 
due to respondents. Without findings and conclusions, we can only as-
sume that the court below did not consider this pivotal issue to be 
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material to resolution of the controversy. 
The trial court, in error, disregarded all conflicting averments 
and entered summary judgment. Appellants are entitled to further pro-
ceedings at which the evidence relating to the dispute may be weighed 
by a trier of fact and an equitable determination made. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court had before it information sufficient to evidence 
genuine issues as to material facts in this controversy. Those issues 
are more than adequate to preclude the granting of summary judgment in 
respondents1 favor. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed 
and the matter remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of February, 1986. 
GEItALD H.(jCiN6l!6RN 
KAPALOSKI, KINGHORN & PETERS 
Attorneys for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that four (4) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellants was mailed, postage pre-
paid, this 21st day of February, 1986, to the following: 
David R. Olson, Esq. 
Michael Allen, Esq. 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Respondents 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-148 
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ADDENDUM I 
An enlargement of t h i s form i s 
included on the following page 
SALES AGENCY CONTRACT 
Memoer of Muitioie Listing Servica of Sait Lake Board of REALTORS* 
In consideration of your agreement to list the property described on form 3 ano to use reasonable 
e '^orts to find a purchaser or tenant therefor, I heresy grant you for the period stztec herein, from dare 
ne^eof. the exclusive right to sell, lease or exchange said property or any part Thereof, at the price and 
terms stated herein, or at such other price or terms to wmcn I may agree m writing. 
Ourmg the life of this contract, if you find a party who is ready, able and willing to buy, lease or 
excnange said property or any part thereof, at said price and terms, or any other price or terms, to 
wmcn I may agree in writing, or if said property or any part thereof is soid. eased or exchanged 
durmg^said term by myself or any other parry, I agree to pay the broker listed beiow a commission 
of : % of such sale, lease or exchange price which commission unless otherwise agreed m 
writing shall be due and payaoie on the date of closing the sale, lease or sxcnange. Should said 
prooerty be sold, leased or exchanged within 1 ^ months after such expiration to any party to 
whom the property was offered or shown by me, or you. or any other parry curing the term of this 
listing, I agree to pay you the commission aoove stated if I am not ooligated to pay a commission on 
such sale, lease or exchange to another broker pursuant to another sales agency contract entered 
into after the expiration date of this contract. 
You are hereby authorized to accept a deposit as earnest money from any potential buyer on the 
property as described on the property description and informational form (form 3). Said deposit to oe 
held m a trust account. 
I nereoy warrant the information contained on the prooerty description and informational form 
(form 8) to be correct and that I have marketaoie title or an otherwise estaoiisneo ngnt to sell, lease or 
excnange said prooerty. exceof as stated. I agree to execute the necessary documents of conveyance 
or lease and to prorate general taxes, insurance, rents, interest and other expenses affecting said 
prooerty to agreed date of possession and to furnish a good and marxetaoie title with abstract to date 
or at my option a policy of title insurance in the amount of the purcnase price and in the name of the 
purchaser. In the event of sale or lease of other than real prooerty, I agree to provice proper convey-
ance and acceptable evidence of title or right to seil. lease or exchange. 
In case of the employment of an attorney to enforce any of the terms of this agreement, 1 agree to 
ay a reasonable attorney's fee and all costs of collection. 
You are hereby authorized to obtain financial information from any mortgagee or other party 
holding a lien or interest on this property. 
You are hereby authorized and instructed to offer this property through the Multiple Listing 
Service of the Salt Lake Board of REALTORS*. 
You are hereby authorized to place an appropriate sign on said property. 
This Sales Agency Contract may not be changed, modified or altered exceot by prior written 
instrument executed by the Principal 3roker and the owner(s) shown below, excsot that the listed 
price shall be changed by written request received from the owner(s). 
t 
(Form A) jj 
The parties hereto agree not to discriminate against any person or persons pasec on race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin in connection with the sale, iease or exchange ot properties under 
thi? acreement. 
USTED PPnPFs-rv 35 MEST SR^ntlAY 
SALT LAKE CITY. l^AH 
LISTED PRICE S 
This contract is entered into this day of . 19-
This contract expires on the day of _ „. 19-
Lilting Company - Qvtnor 'Signature) 
Principal 8ro*e* (lr»s»<T Nam«» .% Own«r.<S>gn»tu/«H 
BY 
Autnonztti Ag&nt (Signature! / ' / 
I hereby acknowledge receipt of completed copies of this document (Form A) and the property 
description and information form (Form B). * 
moiete oom Form A and Form a. - ' 
^ o y JO owner — i cooy fo uatmq orfic* S L 3 ft fl«vu»<J 2/1/84 
